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Once information is loaded into a spreadsheet, it acquires properties that it may 
not deserve. These properties include believability, correctness, appropriateness, 
concreteness, integrity, tangibility, objectivity and authority. The information 
becomes reified. We describe a case study through which we were able to observe 
at close hand the reification of a demonstrably incorrect and inappropriate 
spreadsheet model within a small non profit organisation.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
[Taleb, 2007] prosaically introduced and summarised the issue which informs the 
existence and content of this paper:  
 
“… things changed with the intrusion of the spreadsheet. When you put an Excel 
spreadsheet into computer-literate hands you get a ‘sales projection’ effortlessly 
extending ad infinitum! Once on paper or on a computer screen …..the projection 
takes on a life of its own, losing its vagueness and abstraction and becoming what 
philosophers call reified, invested with concreteness; it takes on a new life as a 
tangible object”  
 
We first and peripherally encountered the reification of spreadsheet information 
following the financial crash of 2008 [Croll, 2009]: 
 
“the financial valuations expressed in CDO spreadsheet models were reified in the 
manner summarised earlier by Taleb”.  
 
The discussion [Myers, 2005] of the study [Thorne,  2012] of the spreadsheet related 
problems in the UK nuclear fuel industry notes: 
 
“At the centre of the incident are the computer spreadsheets, reified forms of the 
process of measurement…that was also what enabled the process to be subverted” 
 
There is otherwise a total absence of documented experience of the phenomena of 
reification of spreadsheet information within the literature. The purpose of this paper is to 
document a relevant case study which recently became available via a small non-profit 
organisation in the hope that it assists others in their documentation, investigation and 
management of the phenomenon. 
 
In this paper we introduce the organisation and its historical finances, the financial 
planning spreadsheet that is the focus of this study, the spreadsheet error issues that were 
raised and the decision processes they influenced. We provide a summary which includes 
some learning points which may benefit others in a similar situation. We have 
anonymised the organisation and its domain of operation, officers and members. 
 
 
 Proceedings of the EuSpRIG 2017 Conference “Spreadsheet Risk Management” ISBN :  978-1-905404-54-4 
Copyright © 2017, EuSpRIG European Spreadsheet Risks Interest Group (www.eusprig.org) & the Author(s) 
 
2 LEISURE SERVICES ORGANISATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This paper is based upon a small non-profit leisure services organisation (LSO). The 
organisation is a UK limited company and thus its financial accounts are publicly 
available. It has Community Amateur Sports Club (CASC) status from which it derives 
some public financial privileges, in particular freedom from taxation on profits. It has 
been established over 40 years and has been historically grant aided by the UK Sports 
Council and the UK National lottery. The LSO has historically received other gifts, 
bequests and donations from a variety of sources. The LSO owns its own property from 
which it operates (thus it pays no rent) and significant technical assets related to its 
domain of operation. It provides access to and use of these assets for the benefit of its 
members (of which there are 50-100) in exchange for annual membership and point of 
use fees. The domain of operation of the LSO is not relevant and the intention is that the 
organisation and its directors, officers and members remain anonymous.  We have 
successfully used the cloak of anonymity in previous work [Croll, 2005]. The LSO is 
managed by a committee and controlled by a smaller number of directors including a 
chairman and a treasurer who also sit on the committee. All the management are 
volunteers, are members of the LSO and of some years standing. The management retire 
by rotation after periods of between three and five years. There has been a plurality of 
directors, officers, members and reporting accountants and auditors over the years. The 
management is transparent, with regular meetings and the prompt circulation of detailed 
minutes, decisions, financial, technical and operational data. 
 
2.2 Key Financial Data 
 
The LSO has been profitable since incorporation and has built up a significant cash and 
asset base to support its operations. Though initially indebted to a high street bank and 
one or two benign creditors, the LSO was grant aided in 1996 and received a significant 
cash bequest in 2001. These enabled the LSO to replace its by then dilapidated technical 
assets with more up to date assets for members enjoyment. The assets have performed 
well over the ensuing 20 year period to date (2016) with relatively minor maintenance 
requirements and have significant remaining life and financial value. The LSO was given 
another cash sum (a 50% contribution) within the last three years by an anonymous donor  
in order for it to replace a rented asset with a newer and more efficient asset of its own 
costing circa £60k plus a further £20k for restitution of the rented asset prior to its return. 
 
Table 1 – LSO Key Balance Sheet Data 1993 - 2016 
 
1993 1996 2004 2016
FIXED ASSETS
Tangible Assets £156,000 £212,000 £252,000 £247,000
CURRENT ASSETS
Stock £0 £0 £3,000
Debtors £3,000 £8,500 £5,000 £8,000
Cash £3,000 £500 £104,000 £115,000
CREDITORS
One Year -£41,000 -£20,000 -£4,000 -£10,000
NET CURRENT ASSETS/LIABILITIES -£35,000 -£10,000 £105,000 £116,000
TOTAL ASSETS £121,000 £201,000 £357,000 £364,000
CREDITORS
More than one year £45,000 £0 £0 £0
CAPITAL AND RESERVES
Income and Expenditure £76,000 £201,000 £220,000 £226,000
Capital Reserve £138,000 £138,000
SHAREHOLDERS FUNDS* £76,000 £201,000 £358,000 £364,000  
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We show in Table 1 key balance sheet data (rounded) for the key years of this analysis 
obtained from the public record [Companies House Beta, 2017] by 24 separate 
downloads. We show in Figure 1 the key data graphically and in more detail for the 24 
year period 1993-2016. It is very likely that none of the members, directors or officers of 
the LSO have seen the LSO data as depicted in Table 1 and Figure 1, though parts of it 
will be necessarily familiar to some of them.  
 
The balance sheet data shows the transition from early debt funding to grant aided 
“equity” funding, modest book profitability over the long term and stable cash, capital 
and reserves. Trade stocks, creditors and debtors are minimal due to the nature of the 
organisation. Note that the company is limited by guarantee and has no shareholders. The 
rest of this analysis focuses upon the years 1996-2016 following acquisition of the main 
technical assets. 
 
Figure 1 – LSO Key Financial Data 
 
LSO KEY FINANCIAL DATA
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The technical assets, with the exception of the recent acquisition noted above, are fully 
depreciated with a Net Book Value of effectively zero. All the technical assets have 
calculated or estimated remaining lives of the order of 20-30 years. The technical assets 
have an estimated fair market value of £150k and are easily and regularly tradable in a 
pan-European marketplace. Thus the public accounts significantly understate the assets 
(and thereby profits) of the company,  but are nevertheless properly prepared under the 
historical cost convention. The near term sale of the technical assets as part of an asset 
upgrade process would crystallise these profits or they could simply be revalued as 
happens on an annual basis at other LSO’s of this type. 
 
The LSO’s freehold property was acquired in the late 1980’s and is represented at £195k 
book value in the accounts and is not depreciated as a matter of policy. Some  historical 
property improvements - £60k - have been capitalised and are included in this figure. The 
recent profits of the company are also understated because further amounts of property 
improvement have been booked to the P&L. These uncapitalised discretionary property 
improvements amount to a further £60k.  
 
We show in Table 2 our summary of the LSO’s estimated actual profits before 
depreciation 1996-2016.   
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Table 2 – LSO Estimated Profits Before Depreciation 
 
1996-2016
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE £25,000
DEPRECIATION £126,000
RESIDUAL ASSET VALUE £150,000
UNCAPITALISED PROPERTY £60,000
TOTAL £361,000
PER ANNUM £18,050  
 
A recent independent review of the LSO’s financial statements by the Development 
Officer of the LSO’s umbrella organisation confirms that the LSO is “in a good financial 
position”. It is one of only a handful in the United Kingdom to own its own property and 
thus pay no rent. Comparison of its financial statements with other LSO’s of the same 
type and size would reveal that it is one of the wealthiest smaller LSO’s of its type in the 
United Kingdom.  
 
4 THE FINANCIAL MODEL 
 
4.1 Background 
 
During the last few years members expressed through a series of informal meetings with 
the directors and a series of resolutions at Annual General Meetings an increasing desire 
that the directors replace or upgrade the technical assets with more up to date technology. 
This became imperative as the number of technical assets available for members use 
decreased recently due to accidental damage, disposal or periods of more extended 
maintenance. The chairman, directors and management of the LSO were resistant to 
change and procrastinated at every opportunity.  Eventually, the chairman decided to 
commission a financial review of the LSO which involved the production of an Excel 
based financial model by two of the committee members, one of whom was a director. 
 
4.1 Structure of the Financial Model 
 
The model was a simple annual cash flow covering the 35 year period from 2016 to 2050 
inclusive. The major maintenance and eventual replacement costs for each of the 
technical assets were tabulated for each year 2016-2050 in 2016 Money Values using a 
simple mechanism to account for perceived periodicity in major maintenance activities. 
Thus for the first asset, we have “[refurbish]” estimated at £18k in 4 years followed by 
£18k every 30 years. So the model would switch in an expenditure of £18k in 2020 and 
£18k in 2050. Since the first asset has a finite life the second entry was its replacement 
cost of £50k in 24 years followed (apparently) by its re-replacement of £50k in a further 
24 years (i.e. beyond the scope of the model).  All the assets ran for their full estimated or 
calculated lives and were replaced with an asset worth the same as the present (2016) 
value of the asset.  End of life asset values were assumed to be zero. All the other routine 
operating costs of the technical assets were ignored as these would be covered by point of 
use revenue which was not included in the model. Major improvement expenditures for 
the property assets were subject to the same treatment. There were some minor one off 
expenditures also included in the model and a binary variable for calculating the effect of 
adding or not adding in the costs of a much desired further technical asset with a net 
budgeted cost of £40k. 
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Against cash expenditure as outlined above, the model had the then estimated 2016 
opening bank balance of £110k and three choices of future cash income: £4k per annum, 
£8k per annum and £12k per annum. These were three choices of “profit before 
depreciation and one offs” based upon the modellers’ view of the company’s historical 
trading and how this might continue into the future and provide an inbound cash flow. 
There was no narrative describing how these figures had been arrived at. The formulae 
within the model show that the figures £12k and £4k were +150% and -50% 
computations around the central figure of £8k, which figure is at variance with our 
estimate of £18k pa in Table 2. 
 
The opening bank balance was credited and debited with income and expenditure for the 
first and then each subsequent year. The carried forward balances were created for each 
year until 2050 in 2016MV’s. A separate row on the spreadsheet inflated the 2016 carried 
forward balances at an inflation rate given in the model at 2%.  A safety bank balance 
initially set at £30k was also inflated through the model’s period for comparative 
purposes. 
 
4.2 LSO Financial Model Output 
 
We show in Figure 2 & 3 the charts depicting the models output which were first 
presented and discussed at an LSO board meeting in October 2016. Figure 2 shows the 
model output assuming no further purchases of technical assets beyond end of life 
replacement and Figure 3 shows model output with an immediate purchase of a new 
technical asset. 
 
Figure 2 – LSO model output – no new technical asset 
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Figure 3 – LSO model output – immediate purchase of new technical asset 
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Figures 2 and 3 suggest an organisation in financial difficulties with medium term 
insolvency under all three income assumptions whether or not an additional technical 
asset was purchased. Figures 2 and 3 bear no relation to the history of the organisation 
obtained from the public record and summarised in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
 
4.3 Results of the LSO Financial Review 
 
A few days after the presentation of the financial model to the LSO board, the results of 
the financial review were communicated by the chairman to the members of the LSO in 
late October 2016: 
 
“You will probably be aware that we have been carrying out a detailed review of 
… finances recently. The prime reason for this was to confirm what funds …. must 
reserve for necessary maintenance and, in due course, replacement of …. assets 
and so allow identification of what amount of the ….. current bank funds may be 
used to purchase an additional [technical asset]. …..A further reason for the 
review was to set up a system which will allow the [LSO] to monitor the financial 
condition of the [LSO] more easily. The findings of that review were  presented to 
the Committee ….. so that we could consider the conclusions to be drawn from it. 
 
The [LSO] is fortunate to own a number of major [technical] assets. Most will 
have to be replaced at some point in the future; all will need major refurbishments 
and/or component replacement during their remaining working lives. We have 
spoken directly to suppliers… [etc, and]… have been able to arrive at a best 
judgement of when the major expenditure events will occur and what their costs 
are likely to be. 
 
…..This exercise has shown us that we will have to live within our means if we are 
to hand over to successive generations …. a financially healthy [LSO]. It is the 
unanimous conclusion of the Committee that we should not, at this juncture, 
purchase another [technical asset]. We believe that, unless or until, we can 
significantly improve our profitability, we should maintain the [technical assets as 
they now are]….. 
  
We intend to further refine the mechanisms used for the review and to continue to 
use them to update and monitor our financial status. The objectivity they provide 
will improve the ability of the Committee and Directors to take informed decisions 
in the best interest of the [LSO]. 
 
If you would [like] more information on the financial modelling ……” 
 
Thus the information in the LSO’s spreadsheet based financial model became reified. It 
was invested with confidence, correctness, authority, integrity, believability, 
appropriateness and even objectivity. It was set to become the mechanism by which the 
LSO was to be managed for the future. Most importantly, the review denied any material 
replacement or upgrading of the LSO technical assets despite a healthy bank balance 
(unused for two decades), historically secure finances and the members reasonable wishes 
formally and informally expressed over a prior period of several years. 
 
4.4 Initial challenge to Financial Model 
 
In the initial absence of the financial model itself and the data presented in Table 1, a 
challenge to the conclusions derived from the financial model was made based upon the 
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information published in the 2015 statutory accounts which were the latest available at 
the time: 
“….we have conducted a detailed examination of the [LSO]'s financial situation by 
downloading the [2015] statutory accounts of [LSO] from Companies House….. 
 
These accounts show that the current assets of the [LSO] - principally cash - have 
increased this last accounting year by £16k from £80k to £96k. This is largely due 
to the profitable activity of the [LSO] as reflected by the increase in its income and 
expenditure account. The Net Assets of the [LSO] are £352k…. 
 
…..The [LSO]has no debt and is almost free of taxation due to its [CASC] status…  
 
..In summary the statutory accounts of [LSO] show that the [LSO]is profitable, free 
of debt, has no taxation … and has reasonably provided for the preservation of its 
assets through an appropriate charge for depreciation. It has net assets in excess 
of £350k and cash assets in excess of £95k as of its last statutory accounts. These 
assets have significantly increased since 2012…. 
 
[we are] curious about the spreadsheet based financial modelling which has taken 
place to demonstrate that we cannot afford further [technical assets] that might 
better match our needs or aspirations…… 
 
The two modellers requested a meeting the following evening to discuss the financial 
model and the above review. Although recollection of the meeting is not exact, it is 
certain that the quality of the model and the data upon which it relied were positively 
asserted with undue confidence [Panko, 2003]. No mention was made of any testing 
[Pryor, 2004; Panko, 2000 & 2006] that had taken place and no documentation [Pryor, 
2006] was produced. A copy of the financial model and the presentation made to the 
board was however promptly provided the next day. 
 
4.5 LSO Financial Model Review 
 
A review of the LSO Financial Model occurred in two phases, much as described in our 
earlier work [Croll, 2003]. The low level review was kindly performed by a third party 
not involved with the LSO. 
 
4.5.1 Low level review  
 
The low level review of the LSO financial model revealed no major errors, save for the 
observation that about half of the model was not in use. There were many examples of 
poor practice such as embedded constants, complex formulae, strange formatting and a 
failure to colour code inputs and outputs. There was no evidence of any testing or 
documentation save a small revision history and a few cell notes. 
 
4.5.2 Initial High Level Review 
 
An initial high level review of the model was rapidly performed and sent directly to the 
modellers and relevant officers of the LSO. Despite the relatively small size of the model 
there were five main areas of concern: 
 
• The use of an exponentially inflated cash flow over an extended future period 
of 35 years for a small organisation which gave the misleading impression of 
 Proceedings of the EuSpRIG 2017 Conference “Spreadsheet Risk Management” ISBN :  978-1-905404-54-4 
Copyright © 2017, EuSpRIG European Spreadsheet Risks Interest Group (www.eusprig.org) & the Author(s) 
 
the evisceration of cash. This point was badly worded in the document sent to 
the modellers. 
 
• The use of an understated inflation rate of 2% instead of average inflation over 
the last 20 years, which is nearer to 3% [Bank of England, 2017] which would 
have “highlight[ed] the absurdity of the model” 
 
• Failure to use the established methodology of Discounted Cash Flow whereby 
future cash flows are discounted back to the present using an appropriate 
discount rate in order to facilitate the comparison of investment alternatives. A 
brief explanation of the DCF methodology was included. 
 
• Use of data derived from overly conservative depreciation rates which greatly 
understated the gross margin available for the replacement of capital assets. 
 
• No allowance for management’s ability to postpone, reduce, avert or obviate 
key capital actions through the use of common sense, technology or asset 
replacement.  
 
The high level review pointed out that the model reified or made concrete potential 
actions that are in the distant future. 
 
4.5.3 Model test script 
 
Following investigation of the model at high and low level, a very simple test script was 
devised to demonstrate the models failings.  The test script contained the exact keystroke 
by keystroke detail required to perform the following three tests: 
 
• Use the model to calculate how much cash is required in 2016 in order for the 
LSO to meet the specified cash safety margin in 2050. This was £442k – four 
times the 2015 cash balance. 
 
• Show how by changing the inflation rate assumption from 2% to 3% that the 
amount of cash required in 2016 to meet the 2050 safety margin increases to 
£639k – six times the 2015 cash balance. 
 
• Show how, by changing the refurbish period for asset one from 30 years 
(occurs in 2050) to 31 years (would occur in 2051 but outside scope of model) 
reduces the cash required in 2016 by 35k, demonstrating “edge effects” in the 
model. 
 
The test script also asked users to: 
 
• Note that the model does not include or provide for cash (and profit) that can 
be generated by the sale of current fully depreciated assets. i.e. the estimated 
£150k value of the existing assets is not included in the model. 
 
The test script was sent to the Chairman and Treasurer in January 2017 with a request that 
the model not be used as a basis for further decision making unless and until the tests had 
been performed. Unfortunately the model had already delivered its results via the 
Chairman to the members two months previously as described in section 4.3. 
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4.6 Model re-implementation 
 
In order to confirm that the LSO financial model was free of material formula error, we 
re-implemented it using the original maintenance data provided. We were able to cut out 
the half of the model that was not used, eliminate the complex formulae used to switch in 
the periodic expenses and perform simple tests around discount rates and asset 
replacement strategies. 
 
4.7 Further review of the model 
 
During the course of the preparation of this paper the model was subjected to further 
examination during which the following additional observations were made: 
 
• The model did not relate the easily available historical cash flow depicted in 
Table 1 and Figure 1 to the projected future cash flows of Figures 2 and 3. 
 
• The model implemented a single “use till death of asset” strategy only. There 
was no investigation of the value or otherwise of immediately upgrading 
technical assets by selling them for cash and a book profit and then replacing 
them with newer and upgraded technology using the otherwise unused cash 
available. There are many ways of interpreting reality and implementing a 
spreadsheet model [Banks & Monday, 2002]. 
 
4.8 Response to the High level reviews & the Test Script 
 
The chairman responded: 
 
“…..Your fundamental objection to the failure of the model to use the method of 
discounted cash flow is correct….. I have used DCF for evaluation of projects and 
the interest rates that you mention are not distant from those that I have come 
across being proposed by funding agencies. However… to this extent the model is 
flawed but it does allow attention to be focussed on how best to operate financially 
and to give some indication of whether corrective action is required…. A sensitivity 
analysis is usually carried out to show robustness of predictions and this has not 
been done” 
 
The principal modeller responded: 
 
The model uses a central forecast of £8k for profit from core operations (before …. 
one-offs and depreciation).  The draft 2015-16 financial accounts show a higher 
number.  What's the right long term number?  The model is sensitive to this 
number.   
 
And then: 
 
“Re cash flow, lets ignore the discount/inflation rate for the moment and just focus 
on the cash flows.  The [Asset one] £50k in 2040 should be the net cash outflow of 
buying a replacement after selling the near end of life [Asset one], otherwise it can 
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be reduced by whatever we think the market price of [Asset one] will be after 25 
yrs further use”. 
 
The LSO director involved in the modelling responded to an explanation of Table 2 as 
follows: 
 
“We have tried to quantify what we can reasonably see coming down the track and 
to fund it we need cash, rather than theoretical profit or liquidating current assets, 
to buy things. We’ve used inflating costs and inflating income and, thereby, 
inflating profit. We’ve taken informed guesses at the relevant values which we 
intend to modify as better data becomes available” 
 
To which the reply:  
 
“….when the [LSO]  decides to sell [assets] to get something else it will be a 
statutory requirement to book the sale value as a profit because the ….. assets are 
fully depreciated. This is not a theoretical profit. It is an actual profit. To 
financially report otherwise would be unlawful. 
 
“…Assets are routinely sold to support the purchase of other assets. All the [LSO’s 
]assets are capable of being sold at some time or other and where these amounts 
are significant - to the tune of £150k - it would be negligent not to include them as 
part of a competent financial model designed to support the management of the 
[LSO]” 
 
received no response. It is likely that the director is not aware of the basic tenets of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or the theory and practice of DCF. 
 
An ex officio member of the committee responded: 
 
“I think it's reasonable to conclude that our model is not accurate, and basing 
decisions on a flawed model would be foolish” 
 
There was no response from the chairman and the treasurer to the test script and no 
evidence that it had been executed. 
 
5 ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL MODELS 
 
We briefly investigated two alternative financial models which could bring clarity to the 
decisions faced by the LSO. 
 
5.1 Discounted Cash Flow 
 
This was identified as the preferred capital appraisal evaluation methodology in the high 
level review. In this application DCF has its own problems, not least the selection of an 
appropriate discount rate [Croll, 2010]. Also, for positive discount rates, DCF will force 
significant capital expenditures into the far future supporting the “use till death” strategy 
of the LSO financial model. 
 
The financial model described in this paper was constructed such that simply changing 
the inflation rate to a negative number turned the model into a DCF model. The modellers 
did not appear to realise this. The UK government has traditionally used a discount rate of 
6% nominal on publicly funded infrastructure projects. Private firms would use a higher 
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rate on the same projects. We show below the output of the LSO model with a 6% 
discount rate (entered as a -6% inflation rate) and a revised £18k inbound annual free 
cash flow per Table 2. 
 
Figure 4 – LSO model output – immediate purchase of new technical asset using 6% 
discount rate with revised £18k pa inbound future cash flow 
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The DCF methodology using the same financial model, identical maintenance data, 6%  
nominal discount rate and a revised £18k annual inbound cash flow shows the 
organisation to be in good prospective health for the future. The projected future cash 
balances are similar to the existing and included the immediate purchase of a new 
technical asset, plus all the maintenance and improvements in the Financial Model. 
 
5.2 Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 
 
The LSO Shareholders Funds for 1996 in Table 1 shows a balance of £201k. This 
increased to £364k in 2016. We might reasonably add to this 100% of the uncapitalised 
property improvement expenditure of Table 2 (£60k) and the fair market value of the 
fully depreciated technical assets of Table 2 (£150k). This suggests an adjusted 
Shareholders Funds account of £574k as at 2016. Thus the LSO achieved an adjusted 
ROCE of £574k / £201k = 285% over the 20 year period from 1996 or 5.4% compound 
per annum nominal, 2.8% real. 
 
The LSO overall ROCE of +2.8% real contrasts markedly with the -2.8% per annum real 
that the LSO has achieved for its £133k cash balance over the period since 2001. The 
cumulative deflationary loss of capital that the LSO has suffered over the last 15 years 
due to its large cash holding of benefactors funds is approximately £69k in 2016 MV’s, 
less a small amount of interest. 
 
The ROCE methodology suggests that the LSO should immediately employ most of its 
available cash as technical assets in its own business save any cash contingency 
requirements. 
 
The ROCE of 5.4% nominal supports a discount rate for use in the financial modelling of 
6% nominal. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
We have described a simple spreadsheet that was used in a financial review of a small 
Leisure Services Organisation [LSO] in order to evaluate the wisdom or otherwise of the 
upgrade, replacement or enhancement of its technical assets. 
 
The spreadsheet presented to the management of the organisation suggested that the 
organisation was about to enter serious financial difficulties and it could not afford to 
upgrade or extend its assets. These projected circumstances were at variance with the 
solid historical financial performance of the organisation over the previous 20 years. 
 
We have shown how the model became reified. That is to say the spreadsheet was 
invested with a variety of attributes including believability, correctness, appropriateness, 
concreteness, integrity, tangibility, objectivity and authority. None of these attributes 
were deserved as we were able to subsequently identify and describe numerous 
significant weaknesses and strategic flaws in the model. We revealed these issues through 
a straightforward software engineering process involving the performance of a low level 
model review, a high level model review, the production of a simple test script and the re-
engineering of the model. 
 
We investigated the historical circumstances of the LSO by downloading its publicly 
available accounts and transaction history for the prior 20 years and re-estimated its 
actual historical profitability.  We show that the LSO’s future projected free cash flow 
had been underestimated by a factor of more than two. 
 
We then used the original model with a positive discount rate of 6% (rather than a 
negative discount rate of 2%) and our revised future free cash flow to perform a DCF 
analysis which showed that the LSO was easily capable of affording the new technical 
and other assets that its members aspired to. 
 
It appears to be the case that the organisation had been planning its future over a 35 year 
period using a spreadsheet based Discounted Cash Flow Model with negative discount 
rates (contrary to centuries of tradition). In addition the model underestimated a critical 
spreadsheet variable by a factor of more than two. 
 
We used a ROCE analysis to show that the LSO had generated a 5.4% nominal 
compound rate of return on its capital over the prior 20 years. This implied that the 
significant cash that it has had languishing in the bank would be far better employed for 
the future in the assets and business of the LSO. 
 
The reification of the deeply flawed spreadsheet that we have examined has had the 
unnecessary and negative consequence of stagnating the organisation’s future 
development.  This lead one exasperated LSO member (a former LSO treasurer) to write: 
 
“The [LSO] and the wonderful facilities were built by adventurous forward looking 
people but the doom and gloom spreadsheet has permeated the soul of the [LSO] 
and has worked its insidious magic”. 
 
Our experience informs us that deeply flawed but reified spreadsheets have inflicted 
serious damage on other organisations too. 
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7 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
We significantly underestimated the amount of resource that would be required to 
challenge the simple spreadsheet model at the heart of this investigation. Those who 
follow, who might be working on spreadsheets a hundred times more complex, might 
wish to note the following: 
 
• Prior to challenging an existing model, you will need to perform a full and 
effective high and low level model review and possibly develop a series of model 
test scripts. Any flaws in the review process or the test scripts will undermine the 
challenge. 
 
• You may need to acquire or reacquire and then validate the relevant model source 
data. 
 
• If the target model is strategically, tactically or computationally incorrect you 
may need to build another model in order to figure out what the right  answer is 
in the first place. You will then need to perform a thorough high and low level 
model review on the challenger model. And then compare and contrast the 
differences between the challenger model and the existing model. 
 
• Do not expect the management of the organisation you are dealing with to have 
the capacity or interest to comprehend the errors, limitations or flaws observed by 
you in their financial modelling or accounting methods. 
 
Whilst the above processes are taking place – all at the same time, with great time 
urgency and in a seemingly haphazard event driven order - the original model (flawed in 
your opinion) at the heart of your challenge will be seeping deeper and deeper into the 
organisation. 
 
Spreadsheets are ubiquitous and error prone but the scientific literature gives good 
guidance as to the processes required to investigate and correct the errors. It would be 
wise to follow the literature. We estimate that the time required to challenge a reified 
model is at least three to six times the time required to create the (probably untested) 
target model in the first place. This can be extraordinarily expensive and it may be 
cheaper and far less stressful to simply walk away and seek a fresh challenge elsewhere. 
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